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ABSTRACT 
 
There are two theories on the determinants of the control structure of the firm. The first 
theory postulates that the control structure is determined by company-specific 
characteristics. The second theory emphasizes the importance of institutional 
characteristics in shaping this structure. In this paper, we test the validity of both theories 
in the context of a cross-listing, which causes a change to the company’s legal 
environment. We find that the initial control structure, risk and size determine the control 
structure post cross-listing and that cross-listing on better quality markets facilitates the 
evolution of control towards more dispersed control. To conclude, company 
characteristics have a greater impact than country characteristics on the company’s 
decision to cross-list and are also better at explaining the change in the control structure 
post cross-listing.  
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1. Introduction 
There is as yet no agreement in the literature as to whether corporate ownership and 
control is mainly determined by company characteristics or whether it is mainly the result 
of the national institutional setting. The body of literature that considers that company 
characteristics are the main driver of the ownership and control structure have advanced 
size and regulation (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), performance (Leland and Pyle, 1977), risk 
(Admati et al., 1994; Kahn and Winton, 1998) and liquidity (Maug, 1998; Bolton and von 
Thadden, 1998) as such drivers. According to this body of literature ownership and 
control is likely to vary across companies as well as within countries. The body of the 
literature (e.g. Modigliani and Perotti, 1997; Bebchuk, 1999; La Porta et al., 1999; Black, 
2000, 2001; Djankov et al., 2008) that argues that country characteristics are the main 
determinants of the ownership and control structure postulates that such country 
characteristics are the quality as well as the enforcement of laws, in particular securities 
laws. In other words, this body of literature argues that companies from the same country 
are likely to have similar ownership and control.  
What is difficult to reconcile with the latter body of literature is the fact that some, 
but not all, companies voluntarily choose to cross-list on a foreign stock exchange with 
better securities laws. If the latter body of literature were to be correct, then one would 
expect either all companies from countries with weak securities laws to cross-list in 
better markets or none at all. The fact that some, but not all, companies make this choice 
suggests that there are company-specific characteristics that drive this decision. Bebchuk 
and Roe (1999) argue that some companies opt into a different legal system
1
 to achieve 
their optimal control structure which they would not be able to achieve at home. When 
companies cross-list in a stricter legal regime than their home country legal system, they 
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are expected to abide by the securities laws and regulation of the host market. As a result, 
these companies bond themselves not to expropriate their minority shareholders; this is 
the so called bonding hypothesis (Coffee, 2002; Reese and Weisbach, 2002). John and 
Kedia (2006) predict that companies that cross-list in a system with better investor 
protection will experience a reduction in the concentration of ownership and control as 
there is no longer a need for shareholders to keep substantial stakes to protect themselves 
from being expropriated by the management or the controlling shareholder. Several 
empirical studies provide evidence in support of this argument (Pagano, Röell, and 
Zechner, 2002; Doidge et al., 2004; Abdallah and Goergen, 2008; Lel and Miller, 2008; 
Boubakri et al., 2010). The reading of the above literature leads to two predictions. First, 
some companies are more likely to cross-list in a better system than others given that the 
benefits they derive from less concentrated ownership and control are more substantial. 
Second, once cross-listed such companies experience a substantial reduction in their 
ownership and control. 
We attempt to test the validity of these two predictions by investigating the 
determinants that drive the decision to cross-list and by investigating the evolution of 
control over the five years post cross-listing. Using univariate and multivariate analyses, 
we find that company characteristics are the main determinants of the evolution of 
control and that cross-listing on a better market facilitates the reduction in control 
concentration. Our analysis shows that company characteristics determine not only the 
change in control structure, but also influence the company’s decision as to where to 
cross-list its shares. Our findings are consistent with Abdallah and Goergen (2008) who 
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find that a range of company characteristics influence the likelihood of the company 
cross-listing on a better market. 
To date, the relation between cross-listing and the control structure is as yet very 
limited. Ayyagari and Doidge (2010) find that foreign companies that list on the U.S. 
stock markets experience a reduction in control. However, this study as well as the 
majority of the other studies on cross-listing is limited to the study of non-U.S. 
companies cross-listing in the U.S. In contrast, our paper is based on a sample of 128 
companies from 17 countries cross-listing on 14 different stock markets around the 
world. Roosenboom and van Dijk (2009) argue that ignoring cross-listing on non-U.S. 
markets leads to an incomplete understanding of the effects of cross-listing. Our paper 
does not suffer from this flaw. Our paper also improves on Ayyagari and Doidge (2010) 
by using more appropriate measures of the strength of the improvement in the legal 
protection of investors via cross-listing. Indeed, Ayyagari and Doidge (2010) use La 
Porta et al.’s (1998) shareholder rights index, which measures investor protection 
stemming from corporate law. However, when a firm cross-lists on a foreign market it 
exposes itself to the securities laws of that market and not to its corporate law.
2
 Hence, 
the La Porta et al. shareholder rights index is not the right metric to assess a change in 
shareholder protection brought about by a cross-listing. The index has also been criticised 
for suffering from errors in encoding law given the use of secondary rather than primary 
legal sources (see Spamann, 2010). We use  indices measuring accounting standards and 
the quality of securities laws. Securities laws indices include the disclosure requirements, 
liability, and public enforcement from La Porta et al. (2006), and the staffing and the 
budget of the securities regulator which measure public and private enforcement of 
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securities laws as per Jackson and Roe (2009). A more detailed description of these 
measures is provided in our methodology section (see section 4.2).  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the relation between 
the national setting, more specifically law, and the control structure. In the first part of 
that section we discuss the effect of legal rules on the control structures prevailing in the 
home country. Thereafter we discuss how cross-listing affects the control structure of the 
firm and how changes in the legal environment of the company via cross-listing affect its 
control structure. Section 3 reviews the literature on the relation between company 
characteristics and the control structure. Section 4 describes the methodology, sources of 
data and variables used in this study. Section 5 discusses the evolution of control post 
cross-listing. We examine the determinants of control post cross-listing in Section 6. 
Section 7 contains the sensitivity analysis, and Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. The National Setting and the Control Structure 
2.1 Corporate Law as a Determinant of Control 
The seminal work of La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) investigates the relation between 
the control and ownership structure and the legal system. They find that common law 
countries offer greater shareholder protection compared to civil law countries, and as a 
consequence dispersed control is more likely in the former whereas in the latter 
concentrated control is more likely. A number of empirical studies on the ownership and 
control structure for individual countries
3
 confirm La Porta et al.’s (1999) findings. The 
question arises as to how these differences in the legal rules shape the observed patterns 
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of control across countries. There are a set of rules that encourage certain types of control 
structures. Below we will discuss some of these rules. 
Among the legal rules that differ across countries are the takeover provisions. In 
some countries the takeover code includes a rule with a mandatory offer to be made to all 
remaining shareholders if a share block above a certain threshold has been acquired in a 
firm. The higher the threshold, the greater the control that can be accumulated before a 
mandatory offer has to be made. In 2004 the European Council approved the EU 
Takeover Directive, introducing the mandatory offer rule across the entire EU (see 
Goergen et al., 2005). However, member states were allowed to determine the percentage 
of voting rights that would trigger the mandatory offer. According to the assessment 
report on the Takeover Directive,
4
 most of the member states introduced a threshold 
somewhere between 30% and 33.3% of the voting rights.
 
For example, in France the 
threshold is 33.3%. This means that an investor can acquire up to 33.2% of the voting 
rights of the company without taking the risk of ending up holding all shares in the 
company. In contrast, Canada has a threshold of only 20%. Therefore, an investor with 
limited wealth is reluctant to acquire more than 20% of the shares of a Canadian 
company, because s/he will end up having to make a bid for the whole company if this 
threshold is exceeded. This illustrates how the mandatory offer rule enables higher 
control concentration in France, while discouraging the building up of control blocks in 
Canada.
5
 
6
 
Another legal difference between countries is the application or violation of the 
one-share-one-vote principle (Grossman and Hart, 1988). In some countries company law 
and securities regulation permit the use of devices to separate control rights from cash 
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flow rights. There are several ways to separate control from ownership such as dual-class 
shares, cross-shareholdings and pyramid structures. These devices enable the initial 
owner to maintain control over the company, but with little contribution to the capital. 
The lawmakers in Sweden literally encourage dual-class shares. They view them as 
having significant advantages and as a necessary condition for “an efficient management 
as well as for the long-term planning of the firm’s activities” and hence these shares can 
“significantly promote the efficiency and development of individual firms as well as of the 
business sector in general.”7 Holmén and Högfeldt (2004) report that 90% of their 
sample of Swedish privately controlled initial public offerings (IPOs) have dual-class 
shares outstanding with only low-voting B-shares in the hands of outside investors.
8
 In 
addition, Goergen and Renneboog (2003) report that 38% of the German family-
controlled IPO companies they study have non-voting shares outstanding. Nevertheless, it 
would be wrong to conclude that breaches of the one-share-one-vote principle are limited 
to civil law countries. Indeed, there are many US companies with dual-class shares (e.g. 
Ford Motor Company, Facebook and Google). 
Furthermore, a legal system that allows the separation of ownership rights from 
control rights enables the initial owner to retain a controlling block after the IPO and to 
bargain the transfer of control with a potential new controlling shareholder later on. As a 
consequence control will remain concentrated over time as predicted by the path 
dependence theory of Bebchuk and Roe (1999). Empirical evidence from Pagano et al. 
(1996) and Goergen (1998) reveals that the initial owners of Italian and German IPO 
firms, respectively, maintain a controlling block a long time after the IPO.
9
 On the 
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contrary, in the U.K. the majority of shares owned by the pre-IPO shareholders are sold 
in the IPO or during the subsequent years (Brennan and Franks, 1997; Goergen, 1998).
10
  
To summarise, it appears that legal rules influence the ownership and control 
structure within the country and that differences in these rules may explain cross-country 
differences in control. Countries with better laws, in particular securities laws, adopt rules 
that encourage the dispersion of control by providing protection for outside investors. In 
contrast, other countries implement rules that support existing controlling stakes and/or 
incentivise the building up of new controlling stakes given the weak protection of 
minority shareholders. 
 
2.2 The Effects of Cross-listing on Corporate Control 
Survey evidence reveals that managers consider growth in the shareholder base 
and dispersion of share ownership as a major benefit of cross-listing (see Mittoo, 1992; 
Fatemi and Rad, 1996; Yamori and Baba, 1999; Bancel and Mittoo, 2001). Cross-listing 
the company’s shares abroad makes it easier for foreign investors to acquire and trade the 
shares since holding shares in a foreign company listed on the company’s domestic 
market is riskier and also costlier than holding shares in a company listed on the local 
market. This is because of the informational barriers resulting from differences in 
language, currency, financial reporting and auditing practices, and lack of interest of local 
security analysts and the financial press in foreign companies. These barriers create a 
home bias, whereby investors allocate a larger than optimal proportion of their portfolio 
weights to domestic stocks.
11
 Cross-listing diminishes these barriers as the company has 
to prepare periodically information complying with local requirements, in particular 
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securities laws. In addition, the company gains local media coverage and interest by local 
security analysts. Accordingly, it will be easier for the local investors to obtain timely and 
relevant information about the company. This will reduce the risk borne by them, hence 
encouraging them to trade in the shares. Therefore we expect a decrease in control 
concentration post cross-listing. 
Further, the impact of cross-listing on the control structure may vary across cross-
listing locations. According to the discussion in Section 2.1 legal rules influence the 
optimal ownership and control structure in a given country. Therefore changes in these 
legal rules, via exposure to another country’s securities laws, are likely to trigger a 
change in the ownership and control structure as predicted by John and Kedia (2006). 
Companies that cross-list in a better legal environment than their home market subject 
themselves to stricter securities laws, which in turn may affect their control structure post 
cross-listing. Thus ceteris-paribus, companies may choose the market for their cross-
listing in accordance with their control structure. There are three possible choices of 
markets: i) the company cross-lists on a market with the same level of shareholder 
protection as on its home market, ii) it cross-lists on a market with better shareholder 
protection, or iii) it cross-lists on a market with lower shareholder protection. 
Each of these choices are likely to have different implications for the control 
structure. If the company cross-lists on a market with a similar level of shareholder 
protection, we do not expect it to undergo a major change in control because the legal 
rules in the host and home market are similar. Cross-listing on markets with better 
shareholder protection is expected to result in a reduction in control concentration after 
the cross-listing. In contrast, we do not expect companies that cross-list on markets with 
  
   10 
lower levels of shareholder protection than their home markets to be affected by the legal 
rules of the host market. Hence, we do not expect these firms to experience major 
changes in their control structure after the cross-listing. 
The discussion from this sub-section as well as the previous one implies that 
companies from countries with weaker securities laws are more likely to cross-list as 
these firms are prevented from achieving their desired control structure on their home 
market. Moreover, once they are cross-listed, the evolution of their control structure is 
mainly determined by the improvement in investor protection brought about by the cross-
listing. This leads us to our first two hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Companies from home markets with weak legal investor protection are 
more likely to cross-list. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The evolution of control post cross-listing is mainly determined by the 
securities laws of the host market. 
 
3. Corporate Characteristics as Determinants of Control 
Although the legal environment in general and securities laws in particular may 
be an important determinant of the ownership and control structure, they do not explain 
differences in that structure across companies from the same country. In fact, company 
characteristics may not only be the main determinants of the ownership and control 
structure, but may also be the reason why some companies cross-list in a better legal 
system. Indeed, doing so may be the only way for such companies to achieve their 
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optimal ownership and control structure, which they would not be able to achieve in their 
home market. Below we discuss these company characteristics in more detail. 
 
3.1 Company Risk 
The instability of the company’s environment may influence its optimal control 
structure. In general, investors are risk averse and they prefer to invest in companies with 
relatively stable returns. Although investing in a risky company comes hand in hand with 
a higher expected return, compensating for the additional risk, investors may be reluctant 
to allocate a large proportion of their wealth to a single high-risk company. Kahn and 
Winton’s (1998) model predicts that ownership concentration is lower in relatively 
“opaque” or risky companies. Himmelberg et al. (1999) find evidence that managerial 
ownership in U.S. companies decreases with idiosyncratic risk. Therefore risky 
companies are more likely to cross-list, if they cannot achieve dispersed ownership and 
control in their home market, and they will experience a reduction in control 
concentration post cross-listing as their owners will proceed with diversifying their 
portfolios.  
 
3.2 Company Size 
A company’s size affects its optimal control and ownership structure. Large 
companies need substantial funds and the wealth of the controlling shareholder may not 
be sufficient to meet these needs. Therefore, wealth constraints and the diversification 
motive constrain the holding of major stakes in large companies (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985). This suggests that large firms from weak legal systems are more likely to cross-list 
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and that the decrease in control post cross-listing increases with firm size. It must be 
pointed out, however, that this inverse relation between size and control is likely to be 
weaker for companies where the controlling shareholders can maintain control of the 
company with a relatively small amount of capital investment. This can be achieved by 
using devices that separate control rights from cash flow rights, such as dual-class shares 
and pyramidal structures. 
 
3.3 Company Profitability 
A large body of literature maintains that the current control and ownership 
structure depends on company performance (Short, 1994; Franks et al., 2001; and 
Holderness, 2003). Poor performance signals poor monitoring, and hence bad 
performance may trigger a transfer of control and the removal of the underperforming 
managers. Furthermore, insiders acting on private information may change their holdings 
in the company according to their expectations about the future performance. Gilson 
(1990) presents evidence that banks and creditors increase their common stock ownership 
in companies that are financially distressed. Kole (1996) finds evidence that past 
performance has an effect on current managerial ownership.
12
 This suggests that 
companies with weak performance are less likely to see a reduction in their ownership 
and control concentration post cross-listing. 
 
3.4 Company Growth 
Company growth may also influence corporate control. High-growth companies 
are more likely to cross-list in order to tap into new capital markets and raise more 
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capital; consequently control by the initial shareholders may become diluted once the 
company is cross listed. Although companies can finance their growth by issuing non-
voting shares, there is a limit to this as the total face value of these shares may not exceed 
a certain percentage of the total face value of the share capital. For instance, in France 
non-voting shares cannot represent more than 25% of the capital (see Bloch and Kremp, 
2001) whereas in Germany they cannot exceed 50% of the capital (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2003). Therefore, we still expect a negative relation between growth and the 
initial shareholders’ control post cross-listing. 
To sum up this section, financial theory and the results from empirical studies 
suggest that the decision to cross-list is driven by company characteristics and that the 
evolution of control after cross-listing is mainly driven by company characteristics. This 
leads us to our final two hypotheses, which contrast with the above two hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The company’s characteristics are the main drivers of the decision to 
cross-list. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: The evolution of control post cross-listing is mainly determined by the 
company’s characteristics. 
 
4. Methodology and Sample Selection 
4.1 Sample Selection 
Our sample consists of 128 companies from 17 countries that cross-list on 14 
different stock exchanges during the period of 1990 to 2006.
13
 The stock exchanges 
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represent the main stock exchanges in the U.S. and Western Europe as well as the Tokyo 
and Johannesburg stock exchanges. In order to identify cross-listed companies, we 
compare the lists of foreign companies and those of domestic companies listed on these 
14 stock exchanges.
14
 The lists of the domestic companies are from the first and second 
tier markets of each individual stock exchange. After comparing the lists of foreign and 
domestic companies, we are able to identify 984 cross-listed companies. To keep the data 
collection effort within reasonable limits,
15
 we randomly select 204 companies which 
represent 20% of the population of cross-listed companies among the 14 stock markets 
during the sample period.
16
  We use stratified random sampling to obtain a representative 
sample of the population, thus reducing sampling error (see Cortinhas and Black, 2012, 
p.240). The population of cross-listed firms is stratified by country and a random sample 
of firms is taken from each country. We eliminate 17 companies because they were listed 
on a foreign market before being listed on their home market. We require companies to 
obtain their cross-listing during our sample period. This criterion eliminates 10 firms 
which cross-listed before 1990. We drop 49 companies due to a lack of ownership and 
control data. Table 1 reports the distribution of our sample by country of origin.
17
 In 
unreported descriptive statistics we find that 56% of our sample firms cross-list in the 
U.S., i.e. on NYSE or NASDAQ. Further, 59 (i.e. 46%) of the 128 cross-listed firms in 
our sample are from the U.K., the U.S. and Canada.
18
 
    [Insert Table 1 about here] 
We then construct a control sample of non-cross-listed companies by matching 
the sample companies by country, industry and size (measured by total assets at the time 
of cross-listing), or by country and size only if no match can be found in the same 
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industry
19
 Due to ownership data availability we were able to match only 119 of the 
sample companies. However, when we perform the analysis based on only those cross-
listed firms that have a non-cross-listed matched firm we find similar results.  
We collect the data on control structures mainly from company annual reports, 
IPO prospectuses and 20-F filings, all obtained from Thomson One Banker. Several 
internet resources such as the company websites, the Edgar database for U.S. companies, 
SEDAR for Canadian companies, Consob for Italian companies, Paris Bourse for French 
companies, and the Copenhagen Stock Exchange for Danish companies, are also useful 
sources for control data. In some cases control data are obtained directly from the 
company via email. Accounting and financial data are obtained from Datastream, 
Thomson One Banker and Worldscope. 
 
4.2 Methodology, Variables and Data Sources 
We conduct a univariate as well as a multivariate analysis. The univariate analysis 
examines the evolution of control over the seven-year period from the pre cross-listing 
year to five years after the cross-listing. The multivariate analysis consists of a Heckman 
(1979) two-step model.
20
 The first step of the Heckman model is a probit regression that 
models the likelihood to cross-list (i.e. the selection equation) as well as providing the 
inverse of Mills’ ratio (LAMBDA). The second step is the OLS regression that models 
the determinants of the control structure, with LAMBDA as an additional variable. The 
probit or selection equation is given by: 
  (1)                                                       ,0,0 iiiii XCL  
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where the dependent variable CLi is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if company i is 
cross-listed and zero otherwise. Xi is the set of variables that influence the cross-listing 
decision.  
The independent variables in the probit regression are the control structure as well 
as SIZE, GROWTH, RISK and LEVERAGE. We use the following two measures of the 
control structure: (i) the largest shareholder’s voting stake (LSH); and (ii) the largest 
initial shareholder’s21 voting stake (LIN). While the first measure of control is oblivious 
to a change in control, i.e. the transfer of the largest stake in the company to a new 
shareholder, the second measure does account for this. Company size (SIZE) is measured 
by the natural logarithm of the annual average market capitalisation. The growth rate 
(GROWTH) is measured by the natural logarithm of the annual growth rate of total 
assets. The level of a company’s risk (RISK) is measured by the natural logarithm of the 
standard deviation of stock returns over 12 months. LEVERAGE is measured by the 
logarithm of one plus the ratio of long term debt to total share capital and reserves. All of 
these variables are measured in the pre cross-listing year. 
We also include a measure of the quality of investor protection in the home 
country in the probit regression in order to test the validity of Hypothesis 1a versus 
Hypothesis 1b. We use the following six measures of investor protection. The first 
measure is the accounting standards index which measures the quality of accounting in 
each country. The value of the index for each country is obtained by rating its companies 
based on the inclusion or omission of 85 items in their 1993 annual reports.
22
 The ranking 
is obtained from International Accounting and Auditing Trends published by the Centre 
for International Financial Analysis and Research. The second measure is the disclosure 
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requirements index from La Porta et al. (2006).
23
 The third measure is the La Porta et al. 
(2006) liability index which measures the procedural difficulty in recovering losses from 
the issuer and its directors, distributors, and accountants.
24
 The fourth measure is La Porta 
et al.’s (2006) public enforcement index which measures the enforcement of securities 
laws.
25
 The fifth measure is the staff index from Jackson and Roe (2009) which is the 
2005 size of the securities regulator’s staff divided by the country’s population in 
millions. Finally, we use the budget index from Jackson and Roe (2009) which is the 
securities regulator’s 2005 budget divided by the country’s GDP.   
Table 2 reports the values of the above six measures of investor protection for the 
countries covered by this study. Although the ranking of the countries varies somewhat 
across the six measures, the same four countries tend to rank at the top. These countries 
are the U.S., Canada, Australia and the U.K. The U.S. and Canada are just below the 
average in terms of their accounting standards.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The second equation of the Heckman model is the following pooled OLS model: 
 
CONTROLi,t=  1CONTROLi,t-1+ 2POST*IMPi 3SIZEi,t-1 + ROAi,t-1 + 
GROWTHi,t-1 + RISKi,t-1 +CAPITALi,t-1 + IPOi + LAMBDAi 
+i  (2) 
 
where the dependent variable CONTROLi,t is the control level for company i in year t as 
defined above; t ranges from the year preceding the year of the cross-listing to year 5 
after the cross-listing. As the annual observations for a given firm are not independent of 
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each other we cluster the errors by firm. Equation (2) includes the interaction between the 
post cross-listing dummy (POST) and the improvement in investor protection due to the 
cross-listing (IMP). POST is a dummy variable that is equal to one for the year of the 
cross-listing as well as all subsequent years, and zero otherwise. IMP is equal to the 
difference in investor protection, via better securities laws, between the host market and 
the home market if this difference is positive and zero otherwise. The remaining 
independent variables are as follows. SIZE, GROWTH and RISK are defined as above. 
Return on assets (ROA) is measured as net income divided by the previous year’s total 
assets.
26
 Capital issuance (CAPITAL) is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
company issues shares during year t, and zero otherwise. IPO is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the company has its IPO at the time of cross-listing and zero otherwise. 
 
5. Evolution of Control Structure Post Cross-listing 
Table 3 compares the evolution of the control structure for cross-listed companies 
with that for the non-cross-listed companies over the seven-year period ranging from the 
year preceding the cross-listing year and ending five years post cross-listing. The table 
displays the largest shareholder’s voting stake (LSH), and the largest initial shareholder’s 
voting stake (LIN). Panel A exhibits the evolution of control for cross-listed firms and 
their matched non-cross-listed firms. The panel shows that control held by the largest 
shareholder decreases by 15% from the pre cross-listing year to 5 years post cross-listing 
and the decrease is statistically significant at the 1% level. In contrast, we find a slight 
increase in control held by the largest shareholder in the matched, non-cross-listed 
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firms.
27
 This increase is significant at the 10% level. The results indicate that cross-listing 
per se does affect the control structure of the firms. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Panels B, C, D, E and F compare the evolution of control between the companies 
that cross-list on a market with higher investor protection – according to one of our six 
measures – than their home market and those that cross-list on a market with similar or 
lower investor protection than their home market. In Panels B, C, D, E and F we classify 
the location of the cross-listing according to the accounting standards index, La Porta et 
al.’s (2006) disclosure requirements index, La Porta at al.’s (2006) liability index, La 
Porta et al.’s (2006) public enforcement index, Jackson and Roe’s (2009) staff index, and 
Jackson and Roe’s (2009) budget index, respectively. 
The panels reveal a clear pattern for the evolution of control in cross-listed 
companies. We find that there is a significant decrease in control for all cross-listed 
companies, regardless of the quality of investor protection in the host market, and the 
bulk of this decline occurs during the year of the cross-listing. Nevertheless, we observe 
that five years post cross-listing the reduction in control concentration is greatest for 
companies cross-listing on a market with higher investor protection than their home 
market. Interestingly, the companies that cross-list on a better market also have a greater 
concentration of control in the year preceding the cross-listing, suggesting that these 
companies may be prevented from achieving their optimal ownership and control 
structure on their home market. The findings lend support to Hypothesis 2a that the 
evolution in the control structure of the company post cross-listing is determined by the 
securities laws of the host market.
28
 A similar conclusion is reached for the stake held by 
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the largest initial shareholder. However, the above analysis does not control for the 
impact of company characteristics on the control structure. Hence in the next section, we 
perform a multivariate regression analysis which includes company characteristics in 
addition to the country characteristics. 
 
6. Determinants of the Control Structure Post Cross-listing 
In this section we discuss the results of the determinants of the largest 
shareholder’s voting power (LSH, Table 4), and the largest initial shareholder’s voting 
power (LIN, Table 5) held in year t – where t ranges from the pre cross-listing year to 
five years post cross-listing – after controlling for the likelihood of cross-listing. Table 4 
displays the results for the Heckman selection model explaining the level of the largest 
shareholder’s control power in year t. The dependent variable in the main regression is 
the largest shareholder’s voting stake (LSH), and the dependent variable in the selection 
regression is the cross-listing dummy which takes the value of one for cross-listed 
companies and zero otherwise. We run two types of main regressions: the first one 
(“Main-1”) contains the interaction term measuring the improvement in investor 
protection brought about by the cross-listing whereas the second one (“Main-2”) does not 
include this interaction term. Comparing the R
2’s of these two regressions enables us to 
evaluate the explanatory power added by including the interaction term, and hence the 
effect of the host country’s securities laws on the ownership and control structure. 
The results from the estimation of the selection equation suggest that firm 
characteristics explain the decision to cross-list. In detail, the likelihood to cross-list 
decreases with the stake held by the largest shareholder, and increases with the size of the 
  
   21 
company, its growth rate and its level of risk. All four company characteristics are 
consistently significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively, in all five Heckman 
selection regressions. The negative coefficient on the lagged LSH can be explained as 
evidence of high private benefits controlling shareholders enjoy, which may discourage 
them from cross-listing their firm’s shares on a foreign market. The level of investor 
protection on the home market is not significant at any reasonable level in any of the 
selection regressions. This suggests that the motives for cross-listing are mainly firm 
characteristics. The regression results provide support for hypothesis 1b and call for the 
rejection of hypothesis 1a.  
Moving on to the results for the estimation of the main regression in the Heckman 
model, we find that the company characteristics CAPITAL and  the lagged dependent 
variable are consistently significant at the 1% level and significant at the 10% level or 
better, respectively. This suggests that company characteristics still drive the evolution of 
control post cross-listing. The other variables of interest in the “Main-1” regressions are 
the interaction terms between POST, the post cross-listing dummy, on one side and the 
six measures of the improvement in investor protection brought about by the cross-
listing, i.e. ACCST, DISCREQ, LIABILITY, PUBENFOR, STAFF and BUDGET on the 
other side. ACCST, DISCREQ, LIABILITY, PUBENFOR, STAFF and BUDGET are 
equal, respectively, to the difference between the host and home markets in the 
accounting standards index, La Porta et al.'s (2006) disclosure requirements index, La 
Porta et al.'s (2006) liability index, La Porta et al.’s (2006) public enforcement index, 
Jackson and Roe’s (2009) staff index, and Jackson and Roe's (2009) budget index if the 
difference is positive and zero otherwise.  
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  [Insert Table 4 about here] 
The interaction term is not significant at any reasonable level in any of the “Main-
1” regressions. Further, when this interaction term is dropped (see the “Main-2” 
regressions) the R
2
 of the regression remains virtually unchanged. All in all, this suggests 
that firm characteristics, in particular CAPITAL and the past level of control held by the 
large shareholder, are the main determinants of the evolution of control post cross-listing. 
This provides support for hypothesis 2b and calls for the rejection of hypothesis 2a. 
Table 5 shows the results for the Heckman selection model explaining the voting 
stake held by the largest initial shareholder held in year t. We find results similar to those 
from Table 4 for the selection regressions. We find that the likelihood to cross-list 
decreases with the stake held by the initial largest shareholder, and increases with the size 
of the company and its growth rate. Again, there is no evidence that the level of investor 
protection on the home market has an impact on the decision to cross-list. Moving onto 
the main regressions, the patterns uncovered by Table 4 are still upheld. The 
improvement in investor protection brought about by the cross-listing is also always 
insignificant in Table 5. In line with Table 4, company characteristics, i.e. the past control 
held by the largest initial shareholder, have a significant impact on the evolution of 
control post cross-listing. To sum up, Table 5 provides further support for hypothesis 1b 
and hypothesis 2b. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
In summary, we find that company characteristics are the main determinants of 
the decision to cross-list and they are also the main drivers of the evolution of corporate 
control post cross-listing. In other words, our analysis shows that company characteristics 
  
   23 
affect the change in control structure and also influence the company’s decision on where 
to cross-list its shares. This finding complements Abdallah and Goergen (2008) who find 
that the control structure pre cross-listing is one of the determinants of the choice of the 
market for the cross-listing. 
 
7. Sensitivity analysis 
Since some of our sample countries have a small number of cross-listed firms, we 
check whether our results are sensitive to the exclusion of these countries from the 
analysis. We re-run the regressions in Tables 4 and 5 based on the sub-sample of 
countries with at least 5 cross-listed firms. This criterion results in dropping the following 
countries: Belgium (2 firms), Denmark (1 firm), Italy (3 firms), Norway (4 firms) and 
South Africa (2 firms). Our results are upheld when excluding these firms. Moreover, we 
re-run the regressions for the sub-sample of firms that cross-list in the US or the UK. 
Again, the results (untabulated) confirm our conclusion that firm characteristics are more 
important than country characteristics in determining the cross-listing decision and 
explaining the change in control post cross-listing. 
We also check the validity of our specification of the Heckman model. The 
implementation of the Heckman model requires identifying two sets of variables: those 
used in the selection equation (the Z’s) and those used in the outcome equation (the X’s). 
The question arises as to whether these two sets of variables can be identical or whether 
there should be exclusion restrictions such that some variables from the first stage are not 
to be included in the second stage. The orthodox answer is that the variables used in both 
equations should be determined by theory. It may be the case that the same variables 
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drive both the dependent variable in the selection equation and the dependent variable in 
the outcome equation. Li and Prabhala (2007) argue that exclusion restrictions are not 
necessary in a Heckman selection model because the model is identified by non-linearity 
(i.e. the inverse Mills ratio is non-linear in the Zs and the Xs). Nevertheless, if the 
assumption of non-linearity does not hold, it is more likely that the selection model 
suffers from multicollinearity when there are no exclusion restrictions (Li and Prabhala, 
2007; Lennox et al., 2012). Therefore, there should be at least one variable that is 
included in the first equation but not in the second equation. Although it is a challenge to 
find good Z variables that are not correlated with the dependent variable in the second 
equation, our model does not suffer from the exclusion restrictions problem because we 
exclude LEVERAGE and the country characteristics from the second equation. To verify 
the robustness of our models, we run a diagnostic test for multicollinarity by computing 
the Variance of Inflation Factors (VIFs). Each regression has a VIF of maximum 3.62 
indicating that our models do not suffer from a multicollinearity problem. Further, Puhani 
(2000) maintains that in the presence of multicollinearity Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
provides more robust estimates than a Heckman model. Therefore, we also estimate the 
determinants of the control model using OLS (untabulated) and our results are upheld. 
Moreover, we test the sensitivity of our model to different exclusion restrictions. We re-
run our analysis using the market value to control for SIZE in the first equation and using 
total assets as an alternative proxy for SIZE in the second equation. The results (not 
reported) confirm our conclusions. 
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8. Conclusion 
Over the last three decades the academic community has been debating the 
importance of legal rules, including securities laws, in shaping the control structure of 
companies. In this paper we examine whether a change in the legal environment of the 
company brought about via a cross-listing affects its control structure. Unlike most of the 
existing literature on cross-listings (e.g. Ayyagari and Doidge, 2010) that is limited to the 
study of non-U.S. companies cross-listing in the U.S., our paper is based on a sample of 
128 companies cross-listing on 14 different stock markets around the world. Roosenboom 
and van Dijk (2009) argue that ignoring cross-listing on markets other than the U.S. leads 
to an incomplete understanding of the effects of cross-listing. Moreover, our paper also 
improves on Ayyagari and Doidge (2010) by using more appropriate measures of the 
improvement in the legal protection of investors via cross-listing. They use the La Porta 
et al. (1998) shareholder rights index, which measures investor protection stemming from 
corporate law. However, a cross-listing exposes the firm to the securities laws of the 
foreign market and not to that market’s corporate law. The measures we use include La 
Porta et al.’s (2006) disclosure requirements index, La Porta at al.’s (2006) liability 
index, La Porta et al.’s (2006) public enforcement index, Jackson and Roe’s (2009) staff 
index, and Jackson and Roe’s (2009) budget index. In addition, we use the accounting 
standard index. 
Our univariate analysis reveals that there is a significant decrease in control 
concentration for cross-listed companies compared to non-cross-listed companies. In 
addition, for the former, those that cross-list on better markets – as evidenced by better 
securities laws – than their home markets tend to experience a greater decrease in control. 
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Although cross-listing on a better market facilitates the evolution towards more dispersed 
control, the results from our multivariate analysis suggest that company characteristics do 
not only determine the likelihood to cross-list, but are also the main determinants of the 
control structure post cross-listing. Overall, we find that company characteristics explain 
the change in the control structure and also influence the company’s decision to cross-list. 
                                                 
Notes 
1
 In contrast to La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999), Bebchuk and Roe (1999) do not focus on corporate law. 
Indeed, they write that “the corporate rules system includes not only the rules of corporate law as 
conventionally defined but also securities laws and the relevant parts of the law governing insolvency, 
labor relations, and financial institutions” (p.155). 
2
 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for point this out. 
3
 See Becht and Böhmer (2001) for Germany, Bianchi et al. (2001) for Italy, Bloch and Kremp (2001) for 
France, Becht et al. (2001) for Belgium, De Jong et al. (2001) for the Netherlands, Agnblad, et al. (2001) 
for Sweden, Goergen and Renneboog (2001) for the U.K. and Becht (2001) for the U.S. See also Faccio 
and Lang (2002) for Western Europe. 
4
 For detailed information about the mandatory bid rule for individual member states see the “Takeover 
bids directive assessment report”, page 38, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/study/study_en.pdf.  
5
 Bloch and Kemp (2001) study the concentration of voting power in the CAC40 French firms. They find 
that the largest shareholder holds on average 29.4%. Further, for 34.2% of the CAC40 firms the largest 
voting stake is in the range of 20 to 30%.  In Germany, there is clustering at 25%, 50% and 75% (see Becht 
and Böhmer, 2001), in Austria at 10% and 25% (Gugler et al., 2001), in Belgium there is clustering at 20% 
(Becht et al., 2001), in Spain at 25% (Crespí-Cladera and García-Cestona, 2001); all these percentages 
correspond to thresholds relating to mandatory bids and/ or those that confer specific control rights. 
6
 Although a common law country, it is interesting to note that control in Canada is still exercised through 
pyramid structures and cross-shareholdings between firms. For a detailed discussion about the exercise of 
control in Canada, the reader should refer to Buckley (1997) who equates Canadian banking and corporate 
structures to Japanese-style keiretsus. 
7
 Holmén and Högfeldt (2004, p.7) citing a preamble to the new Swedish corporate law (proposition 
1997/98: p.120).  
8
 Privately controlled companies are companies that are controlled by the founder (CEO), founder family, 
employees or another individual. Holmén and Högfeldt (2004) find that these initial controlling 
shareholders keep all the high voting A-shares and do not sell any of these shares in the IPO. 
9
 Pagano et al. (1996) find that on average the initial owners retain 58% of their company’s shares 3 years 
after the IPO, but they also find a high incidence of transfers of controlling stakes. Goergen (1998, p. 45) 
finds that the initial owners of German companies on average retain 50% of their voting rights 5 years after 
the IPO. 
10
 Brennan and Franks (1997) find that on average, over the seven years after going public, the initial 
shareholders other than the pre-IPO directors reduce their holdings to less than 5%, while the pre-IPO 
directors retain 29%.  
11
 Other international investment barriers that also induce home bias are explicit barriers such as 
withholding tax on dividends or restrictions on foreign exchange transactions. For more information about 
home bias see Tesar and Werner (1995) and Kang and Stulz (1997). Another explanation for the home bias 
is advanced by Lauterbach and Reisman (2004) who argue that investors who care about their consumption 
relative to that of their neighbours (their country residents) favour investing in domestic stocks because it 
provides a better link to the local economy and to their countrymen’s wealth.  
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12
 There is some controversy in the literature as to the direction of causality between the ownership and 
control structure and company performance. Earlier studies such as Morck et al. (1988) argued that the 
direction of causality flows from the former to the latter, but failed to adjust for the potential endogeneity of 
ownership and control. More recent studies such as Kole (1996), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) do not find any evidence that firm value 
depends on the ownership and control structure when allowing for the endogeneity of the latter and 
adjusting for unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
13
 There was a significant increase in cross-listings during the 1990s. Cross-listing activity was fostered by 
the deregulation and liberalisation of financial markets, and major advances in communications and 
information technology which enabled timely and cost-effective flows of information between the various 
market places. According to the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE), the number of foreign firms listed 
on local stock markets reached its highest number of 4703 in 1997. In contrast, there was a decrease in 
foreign listing activity in the second half of 2000 and by the end of 2002 there were 2335 foreign firms 
listed on local markets. By the end of 2013 there were 2381 foreign firms (see http://www.world-
exchanges.org/).  
14
 The lists of companies are either provided by the stock exchanges via email or obtained from their web 
pages. 
15
 The reason why we limit our sample to 20% of cross-listed firms is the colossal effort required to collect 
detailed data on ownership and control on the sample firms (as well as the matched firms). In addition, our 
period of study is 1990 to 2006. Collecting ownership and control data for the first half of the 1990s is very 
time consuming and needs to be done by hand as extensive coverage by commercial databases such as 
Thomson One Banker typically only starts in the second half of the 1990s. It is also important to bear in 
mind that commercial databases frequently confuse ownership with control by e.g. ignoring the impact of 
dual class shares on the distribution of votes (i.e. control) across shareholders. 
16
 Those domestic companies that are cross-listed on exchanges other than the 14 stock markets covered by 
this study are excluded from the population of cross-listed companies.  
17
 The small size of our population relative to that of other researchers (e.g. Doidge et al. 2004) is due to the 
fact that our starting point is the population of cross-listed companies and not the population of companies 
with a foreign listing. Note that a cross-listed company is a company whose shares are listed both on its 
home market and a foreign market, whereas a company with a foreign listing is a company whose shares 
are listed on a foreign market but not necessarily on its home market.  
18
 This analysis is available upon request from the authors. 
19
 We have 58 sample firms that could only be matched by country and size. As a robustness check we re-
run our analysis based on the firms that are matched by country, industry as well as size. The results are 
qualitatively the same. 
20
 When we estimate the Heckman (1979) model using a maximum likelihood procedure, our results (not 
reported in a table) are similar. These results are available upon request from the authors. 
21
 This is defined as the stake of the largest shareholder who is in place in the year preceding the cross-
listing. 
22
 The items fall into seven categories which are: general information, income statements, balance sheets, 
funds flow statement, accounting policies, share data, and supplementary items. For companies that cross-
listed before 1993, we use the 1991 index.  
23
 The index is the average of six proxies for the strength of specific disclosure requirements. The proxies 
are: (1) Prospectus which equals one if the securities laws requires delivering of prospectus to sell new 
securities , and zero otherwise; (2) compensation which a prospectus requirement related to the disclosing 
of compensation of the issuer’s directors and key officers; (3)  Shareholders which is an index of disclosure 
requirement related to the issuer’s equity ownership structure; (4) Insider ownership is an index of 
prospectus disclosure regarding the equity ownership of the issuer’s shares by directors and key officers; 
(5) Irregular contracts which is an index of prospectus disclosure regarding the issuer’s contracts outside 
the ordinary course of business; (6) Transactions which is an index of the prospectus disclosure 
requirements regarding transaction between the issuer and its directors, officers, and/or large shareholders. 
The proxies two to six each assigned a value of one, one half or zero depending on the extent of disclosure, 
with one being highest level of disclosure requirement.  
24
 The index is the average of three liability standards. The standards are: (1) liability standard for the issuer 
and its directors which is an index for the procedural difficulty in recovering losses from the issuer and its 
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directors in civil liability case for losses due to misleading statements in the prospectus; (2) liability 
standard for distributors which is an index of the procedural difficulty in recovering losses from distributor 
in civil liability case for losses due to misleading statements in the prospectus; (3) liability standard for 
accountant which is an index of the procedural difficulty in recovering losses from accountant in civil 
liability case for losses due to misleading statements in audited financial information accompanying the 
prospectus. Each standard is assigned a value of one, two third, one third, and zero depending on the 
requirements needed to prove the prospectus contains misleading information with the value of one 
indicates the minimum requirements. 
25
 The index is the mean of five enforcement indices. The indices are: (1) supervisor characteristic index; 
(2) rule-marking power index; (3) investigative powers index; (4) orders index; and (5) criminal index. A 
detailed explanation of these indices is available in La Porta et al. (2006). 
26
 ROA = (Net Income before Preferred Dividends + ((Interest Expense on Debt-Interest Capitalized) * (1-
Tax Rate))) / Last Year's Total Assets * 100. 
27
 Further analysis reveals that 35% of our matched firms experience an average increase of 26% in control 
held by the largest shareholder during the cross-listing year, whereas 33% experience a decrease of 0.13%. 
The rest of the matched firms do not experience any change in their control structure.  
28
 In unreported results we conduct a univariate analysis by distinguishing between companies cross-listing 
in the U.K. or the U.S. and those cross-listing elsewhere. Similar to what we observed previously, overall 
we find that cross-listed companies experience a decrease in their control concentration five years after the 
cross-listing. Also in line with our previous results, the largest shareholder’s voting power declines by 19% 
for companies that cross-list in the U.S. and the U.K. compared to only 7% for those companies that cross-
list elsewhere. 
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Table 1. Distribution of population and final sample by country of origin 
 
 No. of  companies from the country of origin 
Country of origin Population % of the total Initial sample % of total Final sample % of total 
Austria 5 1% 2 1% 0 0% 
Australia 68 7% 16 8% 10 8% 
Belgium 10 1% 3 1% 2 2% 
Canada 170 17% 38 19% 19 15% 
Denmark 5 1% 1 0.49% 1 1% 
France 50 5% 11 5% 5 4% 
Germany 46 5% 11 5% 9 7% 
Ireland 58 6% 12 6% 6 5% 
Italy 15 2% 3 1% 3 2% 
Japan 84 9% 15 7% 6 5% 
Netherlands 41 4% 9 4% 5 4% 
New Zealand 29 3% 6 3% 6 5% 
Norway 13 1% 4 2% 4 3% 
South Africa 30 3% 6 3% 2 2% 
Sweden 24 2% 5 2% 5 4% 
Switzerland 22 2% 5 2% 5 4% 
United Kingdom 150 15% 29 14% 21 16% 
United States 164 17% 28 14% 19 15% 
TOTAL 984 100% 204 100% 128 100% 
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Table 2. Ranking of countries 
Accounting standards index Disclosure requirements 
index 
Liability index Public enforcement 
index 
Staff (per million of 
population) 
Budget (per billion of 
US$ of GDP) 
U.K. (84) U.S. (1) U.S. (1) U.S. (0.9) Canada (38.93) Netherlands (131,285) 
Sweden (83) Canada (0.92) Canada (1) Australia (0.9) Australia (34.44) Australia (89,217) 
Ireland (81) U.K. (0.92) Netherlands (0.89) Canada (0.8) U.S. (23.75) US (83,232) 
New Zealand (80) South Africa(0.83) Australia (0.66) France (0.77) Netherlands (23.53) Canada (82,706) 
Switzerland (80) Australia (0.75) South Africa (0.66) UK (0.68) Ireland (23.32) UK (80,902) 
Australia (79.73)  UK (0.66) Sweden (0.5) Norway (20.78) Ireland (72,639) 
South Africa (79)  Japan (0.66) Italy (0.48) UK (19.04) Italy (61,239) 
France (78)  Denmark (0.55) Netherlands (0.47)   
 
     
 
     
  
    
Sample Average (75.84) Sample Average (0.68) Sample Average (0.53) Sample Average (0.46) Sample Average (15.23) Sample Average (51,483) 
  
    
U.S. (75.26) Ireland (0.67) Ireland (0.44) Ireland (0.37) Belgium (13.76) South Africa (49,291) 
Denmark (75) New Zealand (0.67) New Zealand (0.44) Denmark (0.37) Denmark (10.85) New Zealand (37,539) 
Norway (75) Italy (0.67) Belgium (0.44) New Zealand (0.33) New Zealand (8.95) Switzerland (29,340) 
Canada (74.41) Switzerland  (0.67) Switzerland (0.44) Switzerland (0.33) Switzerland (8.87) France (28,851) 
Netherlands (73.29) Denmark (0.58) Norway (0.39) Norway (0.32) Italy (7.25) Belgium (27,276) 
Japan (70.71) Norway (0.58) Sweden (0.28) South Africa (0.25) Sweden (7.19) Denmark (25,940) 
Belgium (68) Sweden (0.58) France (0.22) Germany (0.22) France (5.91) Norway (25,109) 
Germany (66.80) Netherlands (0.5) Italy (0.22) Belgium (0.15) Germany (4.43) Sweden (21,988) 
Italy (66) Belgium (0.42) Germany (0) Japan (0) Japan (4.32) Japan (15,754) 
 
Germany (0.42)   South Africa (3.52) Germany (12,903) 
Note: The table displays the ranking of countries according to the six measures of market quality:  the accounting standards index, the La Porta et al. securities 
market laws indices (disclosure requirement index, liability index, and public enforcement index), and Jackson and Roe’s securities markets laws enforcement 
indices (staff and budget of the securities exchange regulator).  The numbers in parentheses are the actual values of the corresponding index for each country.
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Table 3. Evolution of control 
 
Panel A 
 
 
 
 
Cross-listed firms  Non-cross-listed firms 
  N LSH LIN  N LSH LIN 
CLS-1 126 32.51 32.51  100 9.76 9.76 
CLS 127 23.39 22.24  117 12.17 7.60 
CLS+1 117 22.72 20.65  118 14.37 6.16 
CLS+2 115 21.32 17.97  119 14.68 3.82 
CLS+3 116 20.36 14.89  119 14.94 3.37 
CLS+4 115 18.71 12.54  119 14.92 3.19 
CLS+5 113 18.07 10.46  118 13.02 2.86 
    
 
   ∆(CLS,CLS-1) 
 
-9.12*** -10.26***  
 
2.41 -2.16 
∆(CLS+1,CLS) 
 
-0.67 -1.59  
 
2.20 -1.44 
∆(CLS+2,CLS) 
 
-2.07 -4.27  
 
2.51 -3.78** 
∆(CLS+5,CLS) 
 
-5.32 -11.78**  
 
0.85 -4.75*** 
∆(CLS+5,CLS-1) 
 
-14.44*** -22.05***  
 
3.26* -6.90*** 
Panel B 
 
 
 
 
Firms cross-listing on a market with a better 
accounting standards index value 
 Firms cross-listing on a market with an equal/ 
lower accounting standards index value 
 
N LSH LIN  N LSH LIN 
CLS-1 55 35.25 35.25  71 30.39 30.39 
CLS 55 27.42 27.57  72 20.31 18.18 
CLS+1 52 26.81 26.55  65 19.45 15.93 
CLS+2 54 25.59 23.69  61 17.54 12.91 
CLS+3 52 22.71 19.33  64 18.45 11.28 
CLS+4 51 20.33 15.35  64 17.42 10.30 
CLS+5 48 18.33 13.05  65 17.88 8.55 
    
 
   ∆(CLS,CLS-1) 
 
-7.83 -7.68  
 
-10.08** -12.21*** 
∆(CLS+1,CLS) 
 
-0.60 -1.02  
 
-0.86 -2.25 
∆(CLS+2,CLS) 
 
-1.83 -3.88  
 
-2.77 -5.26** 
∆(CLS+5,CLS) 
 
-9.09** -14.52***  
 
-2.43 -9.63*** 
∆(CLS+5,CLS-1) 
 
-16.92*** -22.20***  
 
-12.51*** -21.83*** 
Panel C 
 
 
 
 
Firms cross-listing on a market with a 
better disclosure requirements index 
 Firms cross-listing on a market with an equal/ lower 
disclosure requirements index 
 
N LSH LIN  N LSH LIN 
CLS-1 83 39.07 39.07  43 19.83 19.83 
CLS 83 27.49 26.20  44 15.65 14.78 
CLS+1 79 26.62 23.93  38 14.62 13.84 
CLS+2 79 24.72 20.48  36 13.86 12.48 
CLS+3 78 23.06 17.14  38 14.80 10.28 
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CLS+4 75 22.13 15.57  40 12.29 6.86 
CLS+5 71 21.54 13.37  42 12.19 5.54 
    
 
   ∆(CLS,CLS-1) 
 
-11.58*** -12.87***  
 
-4.19 -5.05 
∆(CLS+1,CLS) 
 
-0.88 -2.28  
 
-1.02 -0.94 
∆(CLS+2,CLS) 
 
-2.77 -5.72   -1.79 -2.30 
∆(CLS+5,CLS) 
 
-5.95* -12.83***   -3.46 -9.24*** 
∆(CLS+5,CLS-1) 
 
-17.53*** -25.70***   -7.64** -14.30*** 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel D 
 
 
 
 
Firms cross-listing on a market with a better 
liability index value 
 Firms cross-listing on a market with an equal/ 
lower liability index value 
 
N LSH LIN  N LSH LIN 
CLS-1 66 39.50 39.50  60 24.81 24.81 
CLS 67 27.70 26.31  60 18.57 17.71 
CLS+1 63 27.05 23.72  54 17.68 17.08 
CLS+2 62 24.78 19.87  53 17.27 15.75 
CLS+3 61 23.32 16.88  55 17.07 12.69 
CLS+4 58 22.94 15.92  57 14.40 9.10 
CLS+5 54 22.84 13.49  59 13.70 7.69 
    
 
   ∆(CLS,CLS-1) 
 
-11.80** -13.20***  
 
-6.24 -7.10* 
∆(CLS+1,CLS) 
 
-0.66 -2.59  
 
-0.90 -0.63 
∆(CLS+2,CLS) 
 
-2.92 -6.43*  
 
-1.30 -1.96 
∆(CLS+5,CLS) 
 
-4.86 -12.81***  
 
-4.87 -10.02*** 
∆(CLS+5,CLS-1) 
 
-16.66*** -26.01***  
 
-11.11*** -17.13*** 
 
  
  
   40 
Table 3 (continued) 
Panel E  
 
 
 
 
Firms cross-listing on a market with a better 
public enforcement index value 
 Firms cross-listing on a market with an equal/ 
lower public enforcement index value 
 
N LSH LIN  N LSH LIN 
CLS-1 85 39.48 39.48  41 18.05 18.05 
CLS 85 27.21 26.28  42 15.65 14.08 
CLS+1 81 26.54 24.39  36 14.14 12.23 
CLS+2 81 24.70 21.04  34 13.26 10.66 
CLS+3 80 22.63 17.42  36 15.30 9.27 
CLS+4 77 21.02 15.26  38 14.03 7.02 
CLS+5 74 20.22 12.92  39 13.99 5.79 
  
  
 
   
∆(CLS,CLS-1) 
 
-12.27*** -13.20***   -2.40 -3.97 
∆(CLS+1,CLS) 
 
-0.68 -1.89   -1.51 -1.85 
∆(CLS+2,CLS) 
 
-2.51 -5.24   -2.39 -3.42 
∆(CLS+5,CLS) 
 
-7.00** -13.36***   -1.66 -8.29*** 
∆(CLS+5,CLS-1) 
 
-19.27*** -26.56***   -4.06 -12.26*** 
Panel F 
 
 
 
  
Firms cross-listing on a market with a better staff 
index value 
 Firms cross-listing on a market with an equal/ 
lower staff index value 
  N LSH LIN  N LSH LIN 
CLS-1 76 36.84 36.84  50 25.93 25.93 
CLS 77 25.91 25.00  50 19.51 18.00 
CLS+1 71 25.32 22.86  46 18.71 17.25 
CLS+2 70 23.55 19.40  45 17.85 15.76 
CLS+3 72 22.18 15.99  44 17.37 13.10 
CLS+4 69 20.47 14.30  46 16.06 9.90 
CLS+5 65 19.94 11.87  48 15.53 8.55 
    
 
   ∆(CLS,CLS-1) 
 
-10.93** -11.83***  
 
-6.42 -7.93* 
∆(CLS+1,CLS) 
 
-0.59 -2.14  
 
-0.80 -0.75 
∆(CLS+2,CLS) 
 
-2.36 -5.60  
 
-1.66 -2.24 
∆(CLS+5,CLS) 
 
-5.97* -13.13***  
 
-3.97 -9.45** 
∆(CLS+5,CLS-1) 
 
-16.90*** -24.96***  
 
-10.39** -17.38*** 
  
Firms cross-listing on a market with a higher 
budget index value 
 Firms cross-listing on a market with an equal/ 
lower budget index value 
  N LSH LIN  N LSH LIN 
CLS-1 82 36.23 36.23  44 25.57 25.57 
CLS 83 26.30 25.35  44 17.89 16.40 
CLS+1 78 25.85 23.54  39 16.46 14.88 
CLS+2 77 24.24 20.26  38 15.40 13.33 
CLS+3 78 23.09 18.08  38 14.75 8.35 
CLS+4 77 21.22 15.73  38 13.62 6.07 
CLS+5 75 20.07 13.26  38 14.11 4.93 
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∆(CLS,CLS-1)  -9.93** -10.88*   -7.68* -9.18** 
∆(CLS+1,CLS)  -0.45 -1.81   -1.44 -1.52 
∆(CLS+2,CLS)  -2.06 -5.08   -2.50 -3.06 
∆(CLS+5,CLS)  -6.23* -12.08***   -3.79 -11.47*** 
∆(CLS+5,CLS-1)  -16.15*** -22.96***   -11.47** -20.64*** 
Note: The table presents the evolution of control for the cross-listed firms and the non-cross-listed firms over the seven-year 
period ranging from the pre-cross-listing year to year five after the cross-listing. Panel A compares the evolution of control 
for the cross-listed firms with that for the non-cross-listed firms. Panels B, C, D, E and F display the evolution of control 
distinguishing between firms cross-listing on a better market and those cross-listing on a market of the same or worse quality 
where the quality of the host market is measured by one of the six measures of investor protection. LSH is the control held by 
the largest shareholder; LIN is the control held by the initial largest shareholder; CLS is the cross-listing year and CLS-1, 
CLS+1, CLS+3, CLS+4 and CLS+5 are the years relative to the cross-listing year. ∆ denotes the change. N is the number of 
firms. ***, * and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4. Results from the Heckman selection model for the largest shareholder’s voting stake (LSH) 
 
 
 Model set 1 Model set 2 Model set 3 
 Selection Main-1 Main-2 Selection Main-1 Main-2 Selection Main-1 Main-2 
LSH t-1 -1.203
***
 0.861
***
 0.850
***
 -1.236
***
 0.864
***
 0.874
***
 -1.207
***
 0.845
***
 0.849
***
 
 (-8.46) (15.04) (14.36) (-8.54) (15.96) (17.75) (-8.47) (13.40) (13.97) 
SIZE t-1 0.210
***
 0.005 0.006 0.211
***
 0.003 0.001 0.213
***
 0.007 0.006 
 (3.94) (0.87) (0.97) (3.98) (0.66) (0.29) (4.04) (0.94) (0.91) 
ROA t-1  0.005 0.006  0.005 0.005  0.006 0.006 
  (0.82) (0.97)  (0.84) (0.83)  (0.94) (0.97) 
GROWTH t-1 0.214
***
 0.000 0.001 0.202
***
 -0.000 -0.001 0.206
***
 0.001 0.000 
 (3.80) (0.22) (0.63) (3.77) (-0.04) (-0.69) (3.73) (0.70) (0.43) 
RISK t-1 6.423
**
 0.364 0.378 6.161
**
 0.322 0.228 6.224
**
 0.389 0.356 
 (2.09) (1.49) (1.52) (1.98) (1.37) (1.22) (1.99) (1.49) (1.50) 
CAPITAL  -0.017
**
 -0.014
**
  -0.015
**
 -0.013
*
  -0.013
*
 -0.012
*
 
  (-2.55) (-2.16)  (-2.04) (-1.88)  (-1.86) (-1.66) 
IPO  0.009 0.008  0.012 0.008  0.010 0.007 
  (1.34) (1.30)  (1.48) (1.20)  (1.29) (1.20) 
POST*ACCST  -0.002
**
        
  (-2.06)        
POST*DISCREQ     -0.038     
     (-1.19)     
POST*LIABILITY        -0.012  
        (-0.81)  
LEVERAGE -0.001   -0.007   -0.013   
 (-0.00)   (-0.02)   (-0.05)   
ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS INDEX 
-0.011 
   
     
 (-0.58)         
DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS 
INDEX 
  
 0.989  
    
    (1.56)      
LIABILITY INDEX       0.221   
       (0.65)   
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LAMBDA  0.065 0.077  0.051 0.028  0.081 0.070 
  (1.07) (1.22)  (0.98) (0.76)  (1.17) (1.17) 
CONSTANT -0.110 -0.054 -0.070 -1.685
***
 -0.032 -0.008 -1.106
***
 -0.073 -0.061 
 (-0.07) (-0.73) (-0.90) (-2.81) (-0.54) (-0.18) (-2.69) (-0.88) (-0.84) 
Pseudo-R
2
/R
2
 0.365 0.845 0.844 0.373 0.844 0.842 0.365 0.844 0.843 
N 1135 512 512 1135 512 512 1135 512 512 
 
Table 4. (continued) Results from the Heckman selection model for the largest shareholder’s voting stake (LSH) 
 
 Model set 4 Model set 5 Model set 6 
 Selection Main-1 Main-2 Selection Main-1 Main-2 Selection Main-1 Main-2 
LSH t-1 -1.207
***
 0.839
***
 0.848
***
 -1.207
***
 0.844
***
 0.844
***
 -1.207
***
 0.848
***
 0.847
***
 
 (-8.53) (13.03) (13.57) (-8.50) (13.25) (13.20) (-8.51) (13.90) (13.41) 
SIZE t-1 0.216
***
 0.008 0.006 0.217
***
 0.007 0.007 0.218
***
 0.007 0.007 
 (4.06) (1.09) (0.89) (4.05) (0.94) (0.96) (4.07) (0.95) (0.94) 
ROA t-1  0.006 0.006  0.006 0.006  0.006 0.006 
  (0.92) (0.94)  (0.96) (0.96)  (0.94) (0.94) 
GROWTH t-1 0.202
***
 0.001 0.001 0.206
***
 0.001 0.001 0.213
***
 0.001 0.001 
 (3.77) (0.97) (0.49) (3.74) (0.70) (0.69) (3.77) (0.65) (0.67) 
RISK t-1 6.438
**
 0.416 0.364 6.475
**
 0.385 0.384 6.664
**
 0.369 0.373 
 (2.07) (1.57) (1.46) (2.09) (1.50) (1.51) (2.16) (1.52) (1.50) 
CAPITAL  -0.016
**
 -0.013
*
  -0.013
*
 -0.013
*
  -0.015
**
 -0.014
**
 
  (-2.09) (-1.68)  (-1.81) (-1.76)  (-2.13) (-2.12) 
IPO  0.011 0.009  0.009 0.009  0.010 0.009 
  (1.57) (1.31)  (1.24) (1.31)  (1.25) (1.38) 
POST*PUBENFOR  -0.025        
  (-1.35)        
POST*STAFF     -0.000     
     (-0.19)     
POST*BUDGET        -0.000  
        (-0.32)  
LEVERAGE -0.002   -0.007   0.006   
 (-0.01)   (-0.03)   (0.02)   
PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT INDEX 
0.154  
       
 (0.42)         
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STAFF    0.002      
    (0.21)      
BUDGET       -0.000   
       (-0.36)   
LAMBDA  0.093 0.074  0.083 0.081  0.078 0.079 
  (1.29) (1.12)  (1.16) (1.19)  (1.19) (1.17) 
CONSTANT -1.087
**
 -0.085 -0.066 -1.041
**
 -0.076 -0.076 -0.944
**
 -0.071 -0.073 
 (-2.49) (-0.98) (-0.82) (-2.50) (-0.89) (-0.90) (-2.23) (-0.89) (-0.88) 
Pseudo-R
2
/R
2
 0.365 0.845 0.844 0.365 0.844 0.844 0.365 0.844 0.844 
N 1135 512 512 1135 512 512 1135 512 512 
 
Note: The table displays the results of the Heckman regression model for the determinants of the largest shareholder’s voting stake. The dependent variable in the main regression is the voting stake of 
the largest shareholder (LSH), and the dependent variable in the selection regression is the cross-listing dummy which equals 1 for cross-listed companies and zero otherwise. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of market capitalisation. ROA is the return on assets measured as net income divided by lagged total assets. GROWTH is the natural logarithm of the two-year growth rate of total assets during 
the two years preceding the cross-listing year. RISK is the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the stock return over the 12 months during the pre cross-listing year. CAPITAL is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the company issues shares in the cross-listing year and zero otherwise. IPO is a dummy variable that equals one if the company has its IPO at the time of cross-listing and zero 
otherwise. LEVERAGE is the logarithm of one plus the ratio of long-term debt to total share capital and reserves measured in the pre cross-listing year. POST is a dummy variable that equals one for the 
years post cross-listing and zero otherwise. ACCST is equal to the difference in the accounting standards index between host and home markets if the difference is positive and zero otherwise. DISCREQ 
is equal to the difference in La Porta et al.'s disclosure requirements index between the host and home markets if the difference is positive and zero otherwise. LIABILITY is equal to the difference in La 
Porta et al.'s liability index between host and home markets if the difference is positive and zero otherwise. PUBENFOR is equal to the difference in La Porta et al.'s public enforcement index between 
the host and home markets if the difference is positive and zero otherwise. STAFF is equal to the difference in Jackson and Roe’s staff measure between host and home markets if the difference is 
positive and zero otherwise. BUDGET is equal to the difference in Jackson and Roe’s budget measure between host and home markets if the difference is positive and zero otherwise. ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS INDEX, DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS INDEX, LIABILITY INDEX, PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT INDEX, STAFF INDEX and BUDGET INDEX measure investor protection in 
the home market. Lambda is the inverse of Mills’ ratio. NOBS is the number of observations. Z-statistics/t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***,**,* denote significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5. Results from the Heckman selection model for the largest initial shareholder's voting stake (LIN) 
 
 Model set 1 Model set 2 Model set 3 
 Selection Main-1 Main-2 Selection Main-1 Main-2 Selection Main-1 Main-2 
LINt-1 -0.782
***
 0.913
***
 0.908
***
 -0.792
***
 0.909
***
 0.909
***
 -0.781
***
 0.899
***
 0.901
***
 
 (-8.42) (33.78) (33.82) (-8.46) (33.03) (33.10) (-8.48) (32.53) (33.85) 
SIZE t-1 0.182
***
 0.003 0.004 0.187
***
 0.003 0.003 0.189
***
 0.005 0.005 
 (3.67) (1.00) (1.15) (3.86) (0.82) (0.95) (3.85) (1.55) (1.58) 
ROA t-1  -0.005 -0.004  -0.004 -0.004  -0.003 -0.003 
  (-0.90) (-0.77)  (-0.89) (-0.88)  (-0.58) (-0.65) 
GROWTH t-1 0.252
***
 -0.000 0.000 0.243
***
 -0.000 -0.000 0.245
***
 0.001 0.001 
 (4.89) (-0.28) (0.13) (4.90) (-0.28) (-0.20) (4.83) (0.66) (0.71) 
RISK t-1 -3.301 0.026 0.001 -3.804 0.013 0.011 -3.487 -0.025 -0.028 
 (-1.30) (0.18) (0.01) (-1.46) (0.08) (0.07) (-1.35) (-0.16) (-0.19) 
CAPITAL  -0.004 -0.002  -0.002 -0.002  -0.000 -0.001 
  (-0.68) (-0.41)  (-0.29) (-0.32)  (-0.04) (-0.21) 
IPO  0.009 0.009  0.008 0.009  0.007 0.008 
  (1.55) (1.52)  (1.30) (1.48)  (1.09) (1.50) 
POST*ACCST  -0.001        
  (-1.07)        
POST*DISCREQ     0.004     
     (0.25)     
POST*LIABILITY        0.007  
        (0.75)  
LEVERAGE 0.093   0.113   0.100   
 (0.35)   (0.42)   (0.38)   
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
INDEX 
-0.018 
        
 (-1.04)         
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
INDEX 
   0.645 
    
 
    (1.13)      
LIABILITY INDEX       0.048   
       (0.15)   
LAMBDA  0.009 0.016  0.007 0.009  0.029 0.029 
  (0.34) (0.62)  (0.25) (0.34)  (0.99) (1.02) 
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CONSTANT 0.605 -0.032 -0.041 -1.290
**
 -0.030 -0.032 -0.852
**
 -0.060 -0.059 
 (0.43) (-0.85) (-1.11) (-2.35) (-0.81) (-0.91) (-2.22) (-1.50) (-1.48) 
Pseudo-R
2
/R
2
 0.216 0.881 0.881 0.218 0.881 0.881 0.213 0.881 0.881 
N 1135 512 512 1135 512 512 1135 512 512 
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Table 5. (Continued) Results from the Heckman selection model for the largest initial shareholder's voting stake (LIN) 
 
 
 Model set 4 Model set 5 Model set 6 
 Selection Main-1 Main-2 Selection Main-1 Main-2 Selection Main-1 Main-2 
LINt-1 -0.781
***
 0.901
***
 0.901
***
 -0.782
***
 0.901
***
 0.901
***
 -0.779
***
 0.900
***
 0.904
***
 
 (-8.50) (34.42) (34.12) (-8.55) (35.26) (34.50) (-8.67) (33.25) (33.46) 
SIZE t-1 0.189
***
 0.005 0.005 0.186
***
 0.005 0.005 0.193
***
 0.005
*
 0.005 
 (3.86) (1.60) (1.57) (3.75) (1.59) (1.64) (3.88) (1.73) (1.46) 
ROA t-1  -0.004 -0.003  -0.004 -0.003  -0.003 -0.004 
  (-0.66) (-0.65)  (-0.66) (-0.65)  (-0.62) (-0.75) 
GROWTH t-1 0.245
***
 0.001 0.001 0.249
***
 0.001 0.001 0.255
***
 0.001 0.001 
 (4.91) (0.77) (0.72) (4.85) (0.74) (0.80) (4.90) (0.89) (0.52) 
RISK t-1 -3.452 -0.032 -0.030 -3.360 -0.034 -0.034 -2.943 -0.029 -0.020 
 (-1.33) (-0.21) (-0.20) (-1.30) (-0.23) (-0.23) (-1.13) (-0.19) (-0.14) 
CAPITAL  -0.002 -0.001  -0.002 -0.002  -0.001 -0.002 
  (-0.28) (-0.22)  (-0.32) (-0.30)  (-0.09) (-0.45) 
IPO  0.009 0.009  0.009 0.009  0.007 0.009 
  (1.57) (1.53)  (1.58) (1.58)  (1.09) (1.62) 
POST*PUBENFOR  -0.003        
  (-0.23)        
POST*STAFF     -0.000     
     (-0.15)     
POST*BUDGET        0.000  
        (0.98)  
LEVERAGE 0.101   0.110   0.104   
 (0.38)   (0.42)   (0.39)   
PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT INDEX 0.022 
  
      
 (0.06)         
STAFF    -0.004      
    (-0.55)      
BUDGET       -0.000   
       (-1.07)   
LAMBDA  0.030 0.030  0.030 0.031  0.031 0.024 
  (1.04) (1.02)  (1.06) (1.14)  (1.23) (0.98) 
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CONSTANT -0.840
**
 -0.059 -0.059 -0.730
*
 -0.058 -0.060 -0.669
*
 -0.064
*
 -0.051 
 (-2.08) (-1.46) (-1.47) (-1.86) (-1.43) (-1.56) (-1.74) (-1.71) (-1.44) 
Pseudo-R
2
/R
2
 0.213 0.881 0.881 0.214 0.881 0.881 0.216 0.881 0.881 
N 1135 512 512 1135 512 512 1135 512 512 
Note: The table displays the results of the Heckman regression model for the determinants of largest initial shareholder’s voting stake. The dependent variable in the main regression is the voting stake of 
the initial largest shareholder (LIN), and the dependent variable in the selection regression is the cross-listing dummy which equals 1 for cross-listed companies and zero otherwise. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of market capitalisation. ROA is the return on assets measured as net income divided by lagged total assets. GROWTH is the natural logarithm of the two-year growth rate of total assets during 
the two years preceding the cross-listing year. RISK is the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the stock return over the 12 months during the pre cross-listing year. CAPITAL is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the company issues shares in the cross-listing year and zero otherwise. IPO is a dummy variable that equals one if the company has its IPO at the time of cross-listing and zero 
otherwise. LEVERAGE is the logarithm of one plus the ratio of long-term debt to total share capital and reserves measured in the pre cross-listing year. POST is a dummy variable that equals one for the 
years post cross-listing and zero otherwise. ACCST is equal to the difference in the accounting standards index between host and home markets if the difference is positive and zero otherwise. DISCREQ 
is equal to the difference in La Porta et al.'s disclosure requirements index between the host and home markets if the difference is positive and zero otherwise. LIABILITY is equal to the difference in La 
Porta et al.'s liability index between host and home markets if the difference is positive and zero otherwise. PUBENFOR is equal to the difference in La Porta et al.'s public enforcement index between 
the host and home markets if the difference is positive and zero otherwise. STAFF is equal to the difference in Jackson and Roe’s staff measure between host and home markets if the difference is 
positive and zero otherwise. BUDGET is equal to the difference in Jackson and Roe’s budget measure between host and home markets if the difference is positive and zero otherwise. ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS INDEX, DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS INDEX, LIABILITY INDEX, PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT INDEX  STAFF INDEX and BUDGET INDEX measure investor protection in 
the home market. NOBS is the number of observations. Z-statistics/t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
